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Abstract 
The Insider threat is defined similarly by experts in the information technology world for 
businesses, but addressing the threat has not been of great focus for most organizations.  
Technology and the Internet have grown exponentially over the past decade leading to changes 
in how business is conducted.  Some basic business practices remain the same – protect the 
organization and its customers from breach of privacy.  How data is gathered, stored, and 
retrieved has changed.  Protecting the perimeter is still important, but these changes in 
technology now open the doors to a new threat – one that is known but not commonly protected 
against – the insider.  Whether intentionally, or accidentally, the insider threat needs to be 
incorporated into the currently used security architectures and best practices.  How should an 
organization include the insider threat to the current architecture is the question.   
Changes need to be made by organizations to the current security architecture.  Currently, 
using technology is not enough, but is still necessary.  In order to make it better, considering the 
employee as a whole and the daily activities necessary to complete a job, as well as working with 
other business units as a whole needs to be included in the architecture.  Behavioral traits can be 
considered but there are issues in privacy that also need to be considered.  Monitoring can be 
done, but that should not be the only thing considered.  Employees lack knowledge as to why 
actions can have a negative effect on an organization and the way to address this is education.  
Educating end users is necessary and should be performed regularly to keep not just the 
technologically inclined up to date.  Without education, the current technology used will 
continue to keep out the intruders, but will not be effective enough to protect against intentional 
and accidental misuse of the organization and its networks. 
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Executive Summary 
 Many information technology specialists follow general best practices in securing a 
network – blocking unused ports, requiring passwords, employing encryption, and applying 
access controls.  These practices are most often used to keep out intruders.  Intruders can cause a 
long list of issues for an organization and its customers.  Trojans, worms, viruses, malware, and 
data theft and loss are big concerns that should not be overlooked.  With the speed of growth and 
changes in technology today, federal laws and regulations are required to be followed by 
organizations.  In order to maintain a respectable reputation in the market, professionals agree 
that protection of a network and its data is essential to maintaining respect and compliance.  One 
debate still remains – what, or who, is the real threat when managing a network and a business? 
Knowledge of, and protection against, many forms of threats is pertinent in securing a network.  
Is the real threat still outside the walls, or could the greatest threat be found on the inside? 
 A renewed focus has come to the attention of the Information Technology security world 
– the insider threat.  Historically, protecting an organization was as simple as keeping cabinets 
and doors locked and providing access to only those who had a key.  Guards, keys, and access 
badges were once enough to protect sensitive and proprietary information.  Changes in 
technology and business have opened doors to new threats in regards to security measures.  
Throughout history, securing the perimeter was enough to protect an organization and its 
customers.  China secured itself from northern threats by building the Great Wall.  Fur traders 
across North America built walls and towers to keep enemies and unwanted guests out to protect 
business.  Organizations have used guards, fences, cameras, and locks to stay secure from 
unwanted access.  With the invention of the computer, new security devices (badges, scanners, 
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etc.) have been created to prevent trespassing.  As computer technology progressed networks 
were protected by blocking ports, requiring passwords, and encrypting data – again, all of these 
measures were implemented to keep intruders out.  The business and communication world has 
changed drastically with the growth of and usage of the Internet and the globalization of 
business.   Both the Internet and globalization have led to a new threat – those who are on the 
inside.  This has become referred to as the Insider Threat. 
 There are similar definitions of what is meant by “insider threat.”  The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) has studied and defined an insider threat as “…one or 
more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or 
enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security, systems, 
services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm.”  (Noonan & Archuleta, 2008, p. 5)  
Cisco Systems has described the insider as, “…often characterized as an employee performing 
malicious behavior – through sabotage, stealing data or physical devices, or purposely leaking 
confidential information.”  (Cisco, 2008, p. 1)  The Cisco study goes on to say, “However, 
organizations need to be aware that the insider threat is not just the rogue employee, but rather 
every employee and every device that stores information.  Employees are insider threats if they 
speak loudly about confidential project plans while on the phone at the airport.  A lost laptop 
containing company information can become an insider threat if it is recovered by an outsider 
with malicious intent.”  (Cisco, 2008, p. 1)  These few examples given by Cisco’s report 
demonstrate how our everyday actions could innocently harm or destroy an organization. 
 How financially devastating could an innocent action be?  With laws and regulations that 
define punishment, many organizations have suffered.  In 2006, Electronic Registry Systems 
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(ERS) was a victim to theft.  With the loss of one desktop and one laptop, 63,000 patients were 
affected by data loss.  Not complying with HIPAA regulations meant a $15.75 million fine plus 
the cost of credit monitoring for all patients affected.  Electronic Registry Systems also suffered 
from a loss of credibility and reputation.  (Kondrup, 2011)  UBS PaineWebber was also attacked 
intentionally by an employee.  The employee planted a logic bomb that shut down 2,000 servers.  
This kept UBS PaineWebber from being able to make trades for weeks.  In order to bring the 
company back online and able again to conduct business cost UBS PaineWebber $3.1 million.  
Figures were not given in regards to how much business was lost while out of commission.  
(Linux.com Editorial Staff, 2011)  Recently, Bradley Manning successfully breached security 
with the Department of Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and 
accessed about 260,000 classified diplomatic cables.  This data that Manning was accessed 
internally was carried out of the building on CD-RWs.  This activity was a major failure for the 
Department of Defense’s network and physical security. (Linux.com Editorial Staff, 2011) 
Whether planned or accidental, an insider can cause a great hardship for many. 
 With the realization that an insider can pose a greater threat than an outsider, new 
measures must be taken by organizations to fully protect themselves from insider threats.   Best 
practices for physical and network security should not be ignored.  Additional measures should 
be taken in order to mitigate the risk against the insider threat.  An important step to take towards 
securing an organization is to perform research regarding the levels of awareness of the 
employees regarding insider threats.  Once research is complete, education and awareness will 
prove to be a huge factor in protection. (Noonan & Archuleta, 2008, p. 38) Recent findings show 
that currently used security measures by information technology professionals is not enough to 
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protect information and data from this new threat growing due to changes in technologies and 
globalization – the insider attack. 
Goals and Objectives 
1. Define an insider threat. 
2.  Demonstrate how older forms of security protection are not enough to protect against the now 
more prominent insider threat. 
3.  Demonstrate how security awareness training will be beneficial to the future of an 
organization’s success. 
4.  Present a new approach to Information Technology Security management regarding the 
insider threat. 
5.  Discuss the importance of auditing and amending controls put into action to stay on top of the 
prevention of an insider attack. 
6.  Demonstrate how important understanding employee’s level of security knowledge can 
impact an organization’s success. 
7.  Identify necessary security controls to enforce, test, and measure against the insider threat
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Many information technology specialists follow general best practices in securing a 
network – blocking unused ports, requiring passwords, employing encryption and applying 
access controls.  These practices are most often used to keep out intruders.  Intruders can cause a 
long list of issues for an organization and its customers.  These practices help defend a network 
against Trojans, worms, viruses, malware, and data theft and loss.  These threats should continue 
to be addressed and not overlooked.  Professionals agree that protection of a network and its data 
is essential to maintaining respect and compliance.  One debate still remains – what, or who, is 
the real threat when managing a network and an organization?  Knowledge of, and protection 
against, many forms of threats is pertinent in securing a network.  Is the real threat still outside 
the walls, or could the greatest threat be found on the inside? 
 A renewed focus has come to the attention of the Information Technology security world 
– the insider threat.  Historically, protecting an organization was as simple as keeping cabinets 
and doors locked, providing access to only those who had a key.  Security guards and access 
badges were once enough to protect sensitive and proprietary information.  Changes in 
technology and business have opened doors to new threats in regards to security measures.  
Throughout history, securing the perimeter was enough to protect an organization and its 
customers.  China secured itself from threats from the north by building the Great Wall.  Forts 
were built across North America to protect goods and people.  Organizations have used guards, 
fences, cameras, and locks to stay secure from unwanted access.  With the invention of the 
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computer and other similar technologies, new security devices (badges, scanners, etc.) have been 
created to prevent trespassing.  Computer technology continued to progress networks were 
simply protected by requiring login and passwords, blocking ports, and encrypting data.  Again, 
all of these measures were designed to keep intruders out.  The business and communication 
world has changed drastically with not only the growth of computer technology and the Internet, 
but this change has also brought on the ability to globalize business.  Intentional or not, both 
technology and globalization have led to a new threat – those who are on the inside, known as 
the Insider Threat. 
 Several organizations have defined what is meant by the insider threat.  The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) has studied and defined an insider threat as, “…one or 
more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or 
enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security, systems, 
service, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm.” (Noonan & Archuleta, 2008 p 5)  
Cisco Systems has defined the insider as, “…often characterized as an employee performing 
malicious behavior – through sabotage, stealing data or physical devices, or purposely leaking 
confidential information.”  (Cisco, 2008, p 1)  The Cisco study goes on to say, “However, 
organizations need to be aware that the insider threat is not just the rogue employee, but rather 
every employee and every device that stores information.  Employees are insider threats if they 
speak loudly about confidential project plans while on the phone at the airport.  A lost laptop 
containing company information can become an insider threat if it is recovered by an outsider 
with malicious intent.”  (Cisco, 2008, p 1)  The insider is not just an employee or partner 
intentionally planning to harm an organization, but also includes an employee or partner’s 
everyday actions that can innocently harm or destroy an organization. 
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 Innocent misusing a network can have severe effects on an organization.  Laws and 
regulations have been established to protect those who may be compromised.  Punishments to an 
organization can be steep.  In 2006, Electronic Registry Systems (ERS) was a victim of data 
theft.  63,000 patients were affected by the loss of two computers – one laptop and one desktop.  
This breach of HIPAA regulations meant a $15.75 million fine plus the cost of data and credit 
monitoring for all patients affected by this loss.  A loss of credibility and reputation was also felt 
by Electronic Registry System.  (Kondrop, 2011)  UBS PaineWebber was attacked intentionally 
by an employee.  The employee, having access to the internal network, planted a logic bomb that 
shut down 2,000 servers.  This outage kept UBS PaineWebber employees from being able to 
make trades for weeks – this being a very detrimental shutdown for UBS PaineWebber being a 
financial institution.  In order to bring the company back online and back to business cost UBS 
PaineWebber $3.1 million.  Figures have not been made available as to how much business was 
lost while out of commission in addition to the $3.1 million repairing server capabilities.  
(Linux.com Editorial Staff, 2011)  
Realizing that with the changes in business and technology, information specialists now 
agree that an insider can pose as great of a threat to an organization as an outsider, possibly 
greater.  New measures need to be taken in order to mitigate the risk against the insider threat.  
Many case studies exist showing this to be true.  Recent findings show that currently used 
security measures by information technology professionals is not enough to protect information 
and data from this new threat growing due to changes in technologies and globalization – the 
insider attack.  An important step to take towards securing an organization is to perform research 
and know your own insider.  Education and awareness will prove to be a huge factor in 
protection, and just as important is enforcement. 
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Chapter 2 – The Real Threat 
  
“Companies spend millions of dollars on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, 
and it is money wasted, because none of these measures address the weakest link in the security 
chain.” 
-Kevin Mitnick 
“If ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, you are certain to be in peril…” 
 -Sun Tzu 
 
 There is no denying that the insider threat is a real one in the Information Technology 
field.  More and more data has been recorded and many have studied and addressed the issue of 
the insider and why it should no longer be ignored.  The greatest debate remains which threat 
should be defended against most – from the inside or the outside.  Best practices have been 
created and organizations are required to follow laws and regulations.  These laws and 
regulations focus on protection from the outsider, and fail to address how to protect from the 
inside.  Professionals follow these recommended practices and successfully thwart attacks from 
outsiders.  What happens when the attack comes intentionally, or even accidentally, from an 
insider’s actions?  The same penalties apply according to these laws and regulations – as a data 
breach has occurred.  To protect against insider attacks an understanding of best practices is 
necessary to identify where the strengths and weaknesses are in each organization’s security 
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architectures.  Once that knowledge is discovered, a focus needs to be set on including the 
insider and the threat that comes along with it into the current security architectures. 
2.1 - Current Best Practice 
 Best practices have been used throughout history to protect a business or organization.  
Most organizations have designated plans on how to protect themselves and their consumers 
from wrong-doers.  The most basic form of security is physical and environmental controls.  
Physical and environmental security controls include simple acts, such a locking doors and 
cabinets, and can become complex, involving guards, fences, access control points, as well as 
temperature controls.  Overall, physical security is used successfully as throughout time a main 
focus was to keep the intruder out.  Currently, physical security has been included as a small part 
of information security.  The overall goal of information security is to protect data and 
information.  With the growth of technology and the expansion of business world-wide several 
organizations have gathered and developed standards of best practices for organizations to follow 
to help ensure protection levels are the best they can be. 
 Security professionals follow guidelines outlined in the standard ISO/IEC 27002.  This 
standard was developed in the United States and is maintained by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electro technical Commission (IEC).  Several 
other countries have also developed similar equivalent standards for their specific country or 
region.  (See Appendix A for a listing of Countries and their standards)  Using the CIA triad – 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (a model created to provide a basic framework in 
security policy development), ISO/IEC 27002 makes recommendations regarding controls and 
how they should be implemented.  Made up of eleven main sections, ISO/IEC 27002 focuses on 
providing guidelines for risk management techniques by remaining neutral regarding which 
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models to use.  Important guidelines to follow include: policy, organizing information security, 
asset management, human resources security, physical and environmental security, 
communication and operations, access controls, information systems 
acquisition/development/maintenance, incident handling, business continuity management, and 
compliance. ("Cyber-security standards", n.d.) 
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) is a standard originally 
released in 1996 to provide national standards for protecting Americans personal information 
with the newer electronic record keeping by employers, health care providers, and health care 
insurance providers.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act outlines how financial institutions should 
report their privacy practices to customers regarding how they are keeping private data safe.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a federally mandated U.S. law outlining standards for financial 
reporting to consumers and partners.  By complying with SOX, businesses can provide security 
and confidence to their investors.  These laws and regulations in the United States have similar 
counterparts in other countries (see Appendix A).  All of these, in all countries, provide standard 
guidelines for all organizations to follow in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability to its consumers.  These all lead to best practices now followed by organizations. 
 Many models and fundamentals of information security follow common basic 
recommended practices.  The majority, no matter how detailed, follows risk management and 
technology based protection methods.  Common beliefs encompass policy development, 
awareness and training, assessment tracking, business continuity and network security tools.  
Risk assessments are recommended in order to identify assets and data and the threat level each 
could be subjected to.  Policies are created to define threats and vulnerabilities and the 
responsibilities of organizations in protecting against named threats and vulnerabilities.  Most 
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often, what are relied on to assist policy are tools of network security.  These tools are used to 
help enforce policy.  Firewalls are used for perimeter security.  Encryption is used to protect data 
in storage and during transfer over internal and external networks.  Anti-virus software is used to 
stop known attacks that could harm data and the applications used.  Remote authentication is 
used to keep unwanted users out.  Organizations are finding that these tools alone are not 
enough.  In the 2010 Annual Cyber Security Watch Survey conducted by CSO magazine, the 
U.S. Secret Service, the Software Engineering Institute CERT program and Deloitte’s Center for 
Security and Privacy Solutions found that 50% of security breaches were caused by outsiders, 
25% were due to insiders and the remainders of breaches (25%) were from undetermined causes.  
The survey also revealed that 37% of the participants recorded a greater number of security 
incidents compared to the prior year.  Also discovered was that 51% of internal threats led to 
intrusions.  The survey found that 53% of the network incidents were due to attacks from viruses, 
worms, and malicious code.  Unauthorized access accounted for 35% of network attacks, 32% 
was due to spam and 41% was spyware.  31% of attacks were discovered from server and 
firewall logs, and 37% were discovered via intrusion detection systems.  These network tools, 
even if kept up to date with current loads and patches, failed to stop attacks.  These tools are used 
to protect the perimeter and log information; sometimes they can stop an attack in its tracks, but 
being perimeter tools they cannot protect from everything. (Lynn, 2011)  These tools are 
necessary, but these tools fail to address all possibilities when considering where an attack can 
come from. 
2.2 - Where the Best Practices Miss Out 
 The new world of business involves extensive networks that extend globally.  Employees 
can be located anywhere in the world, and can be accessing an organization’s network from 
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anywhere.  Trust has always been inherent in being an employee – trust those you hire and 
likewise, trust those who hire you.  Trust is still important.  What happens when those you trust 
accidentally or unknowingly providing an open door to illegal access to the organization and its 
data?  “What’s required is a clear sense that today’s battlefield extends deep into our daily 
routines.  From our keyboards we are each on post in the ongoing battles of the cyber age – ready 
or not.  And it is through our individual keyboards that many of these criminals gain access to 
key intellectual property.  So be prepared.” (Sloane, 2011, p. 1) 
 Several information technology organizations are in agreement and make 
recommendations on how to properly secure the perimeter.  Organizations of all sizes follow 
these recommendations as they are legally required to provide confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability.  A commonly used defense is anti-virus software.  In the beginning of the business 
world using the Internet, anti-virus protection was enough.  However, although still a necessary 
inclusion, it can fail to catch everything. New vulnerabilities lead to issues with policies when 
the operating systems and PCs are not patched, when applications are not monitored, patched and 
updated.  Zero day threats can cause issues and until the vulnerability is discovered and a 
resolution is designed, and an OS, PC, or application is updated, a new threat can exist.  The 
attack can occur unknowingly from a single click by an employee.  These attacks can be 
defended against by using technologies such as host intrusion prevention systems (HIPS), but 
these attacks also have to be set up and kept up to date to prevent an unwanted intrusion. 
(Metzger & Shaw, 2010) 
 Employees don’t just work at the office anymore.  They can work globally and attach to 
the company network from anywhere – home, hotels, airports, etc.  To prevent an external 
intrusion from occurring firewalls are used.  However, when using a computer outside the 
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network firewall an organization needs to trust that each user connecting from the outside is fully 
protected, and this may not be so.  Technically, there are preventions an organization can and 
should employ for these types of situations.  Requiring laptops to use location-aware firewall 
software will help – these use HIPS technology to help block suspicious activity.  A gateway 
firewall is still needed on the organization’s network being accessed.  Again, keeping up to date 
on Operating Systems patches can keep the operating system and other endpoints on the network 
safe from possible infections.  Keeping PCs patched as well, again, will help protect against 
undesired infection from the outside.  Network Access Control will help keep updates current.  
Data encryption helps as well in the case that access is successful due to a hole being found, an 
infected endpoint spreading a worm, or even lost equipment.  Application control can be used to 
keep known vulnerabilities to malware attacks by keeping known applications from being on 
user’s PCs or other endpoints on the network.  Some of these applications include instant 
messaging, social networking sites, voice over IP, games, etc. (Metzger & Shaw, 2010) 
 These tools, HIPS, NAC, application control, and anti-virus software aren’t, and can’t, 
always be at their best recommended settings.  Several issues prevent this such as time for 
updating as well as possible issues with how day to day job functions need to occur on a 
network.  Employees, whether working in the office or outside use the web for work and 
personal reasons.  It is almost impossible to guarantee each and every person connecting via an 
outside endpoint is updated and using the proper security settings and recommendations that are 
set for the organization’s network.  Human error is difficult to prevent.  Data encryption can be 
used to help in instances such as a lost or stolen laptop.  Data encryption can keep unwanted 
access to the data by the wrong hands; however due to laws requiring those who may be at risk 
to losing sensitive data be notified as soon as possible, can cost an organization thousands of 
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dollars.  The cost, per a 2009 study, included forensics, data breach, lost intellectual property, 
lost productivity, legal, consulting and regulatory expenses, and averaged $49,246.  Dependent 
upon what is lost the cost could range much higher.  (Metzger & Shaw, 2010, p. 6)  Another 
human error often experienced is misdirected email.  Mistyping an address or selecting the 
incorrect address could lead to an accidental loss of confidential data.  Again, data encryption 
can be used, as well as loss prevention software, but the laws and regulations still apply and 
neither encryption nor software can stop the intentional, or unintentional, loss of confidential 
data by the employee.  Keeping human error in mind, endpoint security is critical in keeping data 
integrity and confidentiality.  Table one provides questions to be considered when designing an 
organization’s security architecture.  Many of the questions listed in table 1 could be answered 
by many information specialists in negative ways. 
Table 1 
Evaluating endpoint protection: Seven questions to ask  
• How do you protect users from malicious websites when they are out of the office and surfing the internet? 
• How does your current solution protect you against unknown threats not covered by the latest protection update? 
• How concerned are you about the lag between updates from your security vendor? 
• How do you mange updating protection across your organization? 
• How many of your users have installed unauthorized applications such as VoIP, IM, P2P or games? 
• How do you ensure employees aren’t saving confidential information to removable storage devices? 
• Are you able to check that all computers that connect to your network have their anti-virus and firewall turned on and Windows 
Update enabled? 
Note. From Eight threats your anti-virus won’t stop (Metzger & Shaw, 2010) 
  Questions five through seven are pertinent when considering your security against the 
insider.  These three questions are difficult to prevent using many current intrusion detection and 
prevention methods used by specialists today.  Without these methods an organization would be 
non-compliant and susceptible to large amounts of damages.  However, these methods miss out 
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on some important aspects of data and information security.  Knowing it is impossible to prevent 
all losses and intrusions could more be done with the current best practices to better secure the 
information?  When employing security practices, and knowing the changes in business 
operations and technological advances today, a user, any user, can be your weakest link. 
 Understanding threats is the first step.  The lengths an organization should go to are 
dependent on the criticalness of the location to the organization’s overall physical security.  
Using the internet the next point of security considered is controlling access to the Internet.  
Keeping control of who has access to the internal network from inside and out, and who has 
access to the external network from the inside is considered.  Firewalls are commonly used for 
this purpose.  Firewalls are employed at several points in the network – from the main access 
point to individual workstations.  Also commonly used to control access are usernames and 
passwords.  Employees are very familiar with having to use them and organizations can place 
password requirements such as password length and character usage, and password expiration 
timeframes.  These requirements do not always ensure the users will steer clear of using obvious 
information in order to help keep passwords remembered easily.  It also does not keep users from 
sharing password information with others.  In addition to usernames and passwords, access 
control lists are also used as another defense in keeping unwanted users out. 
When access is attempted how does an organization keep unwanted users out?  
Authentication and encryption are used in addition to access control lists (ACLs) and usernames 
and passwords.  Authentication is used when controlling access to network devices.  Access via 
authentication can be completed by considering who has access, and at what level can this access 
be granted.  Can the user access at all, at a read-only level, or does the user have full rights to 
access, read, and change the data accessed?  The types of authentication methods used are 
THE INSIDER THREAT   12 
 
dependent on the organization and the number of devices and users involved.  In addition to 
username and passwords, some protocols commonly used by organizations for authentications 
purposes include:  CHAP, RADIUS, TACACS+, and Kerberos. These protocols not only assist 
in authentication, but provide encryption methods as well.  Encryption is an important 
consideration as if unexpectedly accessed encrypted data is not readily readable.  Cipher text 
methods (DES, 3DES, AES, RC4) and Hash methods (MD5 and SHA) are employed to keep 
data safe from unwanted access.  All of these methods, overall, protect an organization’s 
perimeter.  (Leidigh, 2005) 
 In the end, no matter the method and protocols chosen by an organization, policies should 
also be designed to enforce the proper usage of these tools. “The following would typically be 
part of an enterprise network security policy: 
• Firewalls at all public-private network transit points. 
• Version controlled and centrally deployed firewall rule sets. 
• External resources placed in dual firewall, DMZ protected networks. 
• All network hosts lock down unneeded network ports, turn off unneeded services. 
• All network hosts include centrally managed anti-virus software. 
• All network hosts utilize central security updates. 
• Secure central authentication such as RADIUS, Windows/Kerberos/Active 
Directory. 
• Centrally managed user management with password policy (i.e. must change 
every 3 months and must be a “secure password”). 
• Proactive network scanning for new hosts, or out of date systems 
• Network monitoring for suspicious behavior 
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• Incident response mechanisms (policies, manual, automated, etc.)” (Leidigh, 
2005, p. 13) 
Keeping in mind the above mentioned policy inclusions, depending on an organizations current 
policy set, the size of the organization, risk analysis and cost impacts are necessary 
considerations to creating a successful security policy.  Completing a system analysis and 
documenting the critical and non-critical systems involved is a good starting point, even if only 
for review. 
 How many employees truly understand the ramifications of their actions?  Many may, but 
is security always in the back of an employee’s mind during daily work activities? Many 
employees trust that the organization’s information security team has fully protected the network 
and there is nothing to be concerned with.  A survey was performed by the research firm 
InsightExpress on behalf of Cisco to identify the concerns organizations should consider about 
the insider threat.  Cisco chose to survey to show that, “…despite the security policies, 
procedures, and tools currently in place, employees around the world are engaging in risky 
behaviors that put corporate and personal data at risk.  Employee behaviors included: 
• Unauthorized application use: 70% of IT professionals believe the use of 
unauthorized programs resulted in as many as half of their company’s data loss 
incidents. 
• Misuse of corporate computers: 44% of employees share work devices with 
others without supervision. 
• Unauthorized physical and network access: 39% of IT professionals said they 
have dealt with an employee accessing unauthorized parts of a company’s 
network or facility. 
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• Remote worker security: 46% of employees admitted to transferring files between 
work and personal computers when working from home. 
• Misuse of passwords: 18% of employees share passwords with co-workers.  That 
rate jumps to 25% in China, India, and Italy.” 
(Cisco, 2008, p. 1) 
This survey was conducted in ten countries selected because of differences in social and business 
cultures.  Surveys were collected from 2,000 respondents made up of 100 end users and 100 IT 
professionals in each country.  (Cisco, 2008, p. 2)  This survey, although considering the 
population of the global business world is a good representation of how the new business world 
is facing this new threat – the insider attack. 
 Being a global business world, employees communicate and work together from many 
different points on the globe.  Technologies such as wireless devices have provided an advantage 
in this way to organizations and employees alike.  Data being stored on a network is now more at 
risk as this makes it more accessible than ever. (Cisco, 2008)  This data is moved and shared at 
significant rates, leading to greater risks of compromised data.  Policies are designed to help 
prevent this; however employee behavior can now open doors to additional risks and 
vulnerabilities.  This survey demonstrates how behavior needs to be integrated into the security 
culture. 
 Organizations that operate globally should consider that not all users’ behavior will 
reflect equally.  Not only do employees in different positions hold different information 
technology knowledge, but also different parts of the world hold different cultural and ethical 
beliefs.  A successful security policy needs to make room for these differences.  The survey 
conducted by InsightExpress identified and demonstrated this factor. 
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• China has such a high level of information technology abuse that IT decision 
makers audit computers for unauthorized content. 
• In Japan, 65 percent of end users do not adhere to the corporate IT policy all of 
the time and the research indicate that end-user abuse of information technology 
is increasing. 
• End users in India tend to use email and instant messaging for personal use and 
change IT security settings on business computers so they can view unauthorized 
websites. 
• Employees in Brazil use business computers for personal communications and for 
activities such as downloading music. 
• End users in France have the lowest rate of IT policy compliance of all the 
countries surveyed, with only 16 percent of employees claiming that they adhere 
to security policies all the time. (Cisco, 2008, p. 2) 
Employee behavior should be considered as well as management awareness.  “In China, IT 
managers confront employees directly for not adhering to security policies.  IT professionals in 
India have a low awareness of the extent to which security is being compromised by employees, 
with less than half believing that end users are using non-IT programs and applications on their 
company computers.  Brazil showed the greatest alignment between employee abuse of IT and 
IT decision-maker perceptions of employee behavior, with IT decision makers evaluating and 
updating corporate policies more frequently than any of the other countries surveyed.” (Cisco, 
2008, p. 2) 
 The survey revealed how organizations need to understand employee behavior globally in 
order to impact the effectiveness of policy design and enforcement considerations.  Several 
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“risky” behaviors were revealed including unauthorized application use, misuse of corporate 
computers, unauthorized physical and network access, remote worker security, and misuse of 
username/passwords and login/logout procedures.  The following table provides details 
regarding what the study found with unauthorized application usage by employees.  “These 
applications pose a high risk for data loss by an employee or data theft by a hacker because they 
are often unmonitored and do not use corporate security standards.  Employees also risk 
infection from malicious sites.”  (Cisco, 2008, p. 3) The unauthorized application uses listed in 
table 2 lead to the misuse of corporate computers.   
Table 2: 
Unauthorized application use 
• 78 percent of employees accessed personal email from business computers.  This number is approximately double the level of 
authorized use. 
• 63 percent of employees admit to using a work computer for personal use every day, and 83 percent admit to using a work computer 
for personal use at least sometimes. 
• 70 percent of IT professionals believe the use of unauthorized programs resulted in as many as half of their companies’ data loss 
incidents.  This belief was most common in the United States (74 percent), Brazil (75 percent), and India (79 percent). 
Note.  From Cisco: Data leakage worldwide (Cisco, 2008, p. 3) 
Employees alter security settings and share devices and sensitive information as well in order to, 
“…download music, shop online, pay bills, and in some cases, engage in online gambling and 
pornography.” (Cisco, 2008, p. 3)  Sensitive information was shared with friends, family, or even 
strangers by 25% of the employees surveyed.  Half of the employees surveyed shared work 
devices with people outside the company. Table 3 provides findings from the Cisco study 
regarding global unauthorized usage habits of employees. 
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Table 3 
Unauthorized use: 
• Bypass corporate policy and IT security settings 
– China: 42 percent 
– Brazil: 26 percent 
– India: 20 percent 
• Share sensitive corporate information outside the company 
– Brazil: 47 percent 
– India: 27 percent 
– The United Kingdom: 26 percent 
– Italy: 22 percent 
– Germany: 24 percent 
• Share work devices with non-employees without supervision 
– China: 43 percent 
– India: 28 percent 
Overall: 44 percent (32 percent of respondents shared work devices with co-workers, and 19 percent shared work devices with non-employee 
family and friends) 
Note. From Cisco: Data leakage worldwide.  (Cisco, 2008, p. 4) 
 
Figure 1: Frequency of Personal Use  
(Cisco, 2008, p. 4) 
 
 
The findings regarding remote worker security and the misuse of passwords and login/logout 
procedures are showing in table 4. 
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Table 4 
Remote worker security 
• 46 percent of employees admitted to transferring files between work and personal computers when working from home. 
• More than 75 percent of employees do not use a privacy guard when working remotely in a public place. This number is much higher in Brazil, 
China, and India-countries that have the most reckless behavior. 
• 68 percent of people do not think about speaking softly on the phone when they are in public places outside of the office. 
• 13 percent of those who work from home admit that they cannot connect to their corporate networks, so they send business email to customers, 
partners, and co-workers via their personal email. 
Note. From Cisco: Data leakage worldwide (Cisco, 2008, p. 6) 
The research performed by Cisco also found the following misuse of passwords and 
login/logout procedures and this is shared in Table 5.   
Table 5 
Misuse of password/login/logout procedures 
• 28 percent of employees in China store login and password information for personal financial accounts on their 
work devices. 
• 18 percent of employees share passwords with co-workers, and that rate jumps to 25 percent in China, India, and 
Italy. 
• 10 percent of employees in India, the United Kingdom, and Italy keep written notes of login information and 
passwords on their desk at work, leaving sensitive data accessible if the machine is stolen even if the computer is 
logged off. 
• 5 percent of employees in the United Kingdom and France leave passwords to personal and financial accounts 
printed on their desks at work, so their information can be stolen with any other computer even if their work 
computer is safeguarded. 
Note.  From Cisco: Data leakage worldwide. (Cisco, 2008, p. 6) 
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Figure 2: Reasons for altering security settings 
Note: From Cisco: Data Leakage Worldwide (Cisco, 2008, p. 7) 
 
The survey conducted by Cisco went beyond demonstrating misuse and also 
demonstrated why employees fail to comply with policy and fail to help keep security practices 
secure.  Reasons given by employees were many.  With the stress of today’s business world, 
44% replied that they, “…needed to bounce ideas off of people.” 30% replied that they, 
“…needed to vent,” and 29% responded, “…didn’t see anything wrong with it.”  Some other 
reasons and responses are in figure 2. 
 Policies are created and technology is purchased and employed to protect critical data and 
information.  The old standards of inputting rules and regulations into the latest technology will 
not successfully defend against all newly evolving threats.  Recently, Sophos published the 
Security Threat Report Mid-Year 2011.  In this report, Sophos reports seeing 150,000 malware 
samples every day – a 60% increase comparatively to 2010.  Also noted, is 19,000 new 
malicious URLs each day in the first half of 2011 – 80% of those URLS being legitimate 
websites that were hacked or compromised. (Sophos, 2011)  Some more findings by Sophos: 
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• 59% decline in email uses among 12 -17 year olds and a 34% decline for 25-34 
year olds.  The reason, Facebook, texting, and tweeting are now preferred 
communication methods for these age groups. 
• The FBI estimates that nearly a million people were tricked into purchasing 
fraudulent software.  The price ranges from $50 to $130 netting this cybergang 
$72,000,000. 
• 89% of organizations have established an acceptable use policy, but only 69% of 
these organizations have specific policies for company-owned mobile device 
users. 
• A click jacking scam has infiltrated social websites.  Known as “Chocolate Rain,” 
68,593,657 people viewed this on YouTube – if receiving this link via a social site 
such as Facebook, a person may have been compromised.  
(Sophos, 2011) 
  
Malware is a giant threat to today’s networks.  This quickly growing threat is spread via 
links on the web, via operating systems, and software used on desktops and laptops, and via 
emails and attachments.  Many Internet users today don’t realize that visiting legitimate websites 
has the potential of spreading infection.  Also growing is fake anti-virus security software, 
known as rogue ware or scare ware.  How many want to believe that the advertised software is 
actually an attack?  Sophos released where this malware is often found infecting systems and is 
shared in table 6.  
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Table 6 
 Top 10 countries hosting malware (via infected pages) January 1- June 22, 2011  
• Russian Federation 13.06% 
• Germany 7.88% 
• France 7.06% 
• China 4.63% 
• Poland 2.91% 
• United States 37.9% 
• United Kingdom 2.67% 
• Ukraine 2.61% 
• Netherlands 2.4% 
• Czech Republic 1.74% 
• TOTAL: 82.86% 
• Other 17.14% 
Note.  From Sophos security threat report mid-year 2011 
(Sophos, 2011, p. 7)
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These attacks are successful due to their social engineering abilities.  Search engines are 
gaining popularity by users and cybercriminals.  Knowing how search engines are relied on by 
all Internet users, search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo are often compromised to 
draw in victims.  Of course, the traditional Trojan, worm and virus continue to be a threat.  To 
prevent these intrusions it is recommended to screen web use with protection technology, 
monitoring tools, antivirus software, check web browser settings, and keep up on patches and 
fixes.  Also recommended is to educate those who may be tempted against protection about the 
value of the protection. (Sophos, 2011) 
Mobile devices are proving to be a real threat to the organization’s network – a threat that has 
not, historically, been included in many organization’s acceptable use policies.  Mobile devices 
have become, “PCs in your pocket…because they run operating system software that provides 
access to the web.” (Sophos, 2011) As reported, 85% of organizations have established 
acceptable use policies, but only 69% of those have policies regarding company-owned mobile 
devices, and only 31% address acceptable use regarding employee-owned mobile devices.  
Mobile devices are used for the same purposes as the desktop PC or laptop – access to the 
Internet.  From these mobile devices, as well as from company provided PCs and laptops, users 
are also accessing social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+.  Through 
these social networking sites attackers are able to continue with the popular social engineering 
attacks.  Many organizations have established acceptable use policies, but these policies usually 
allow personal use of the Internet whether throughout the day and/or during breaks.  Accessing 
these sites via an employer provided connection opens up the organization’s network to 
potentially harmful actions.  In some cases, if not protected properly on the perimeter, an 
organization could face an attack via a user connected remotely. 
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Common, older vulnerabilities still exist even in the midst of the growth of social 
networking sites.  Email is still in use and attachments are sent from network to network.  Spam 
and spear phishing are still popular scams used to transport malware and steal sensitive 
information.  Organizations can use anti-spam software to protect against some of the threat, but 
the vulnerabilities still exist due to social engineering techniques.  No matter where an employee 
is located, spam can reach them, it’s a global threat. Table 7 shows an example of this 
international threat.  (Sophos, 2011) 
Table 7 
Spam by Continent January- June 2011  
• Asia 39.79% 
• Europe 28.90% 
• North America 16.30% 
• South America 11.83% 
• Africa 2.50% 
• Oceania 0.69% 
• Antarctica 0.00% 
Note. From Sophos security threat report mid-year 2011 (Sophos, 2011) 
All of these threats are mitigated using common techniques.  Anti-virus software can be 
used, monitoring for malware at the gateway level, using web filtering, anti-spam software, 
encryption, patching, vulnerability monitoring and testing, and rules regarding devices and 
network control all help an organization protect the inside from the outside.  A common factor 
still remains – the insider. 
 
2.3 - Why to protect on the Inside and the Effectiveness of Current Security Architecture 
 The study conducted by InsightExpress also opened up the door and showed how, “In the 
hands of uninformed, careless, or disgruntled employees, every device that accesses the network 
or stores data is a potential risk to intellectual property or sensitive customer data.” (Cisco, 2008, 
THE INSIDER THREAT   24 
 
p. 1)  IT professionals have focused on spending time and money on protecting reactively via 
technological methods.  Of the IT professionals surveyed globally: 
• -33% were most concerned about data being lost or stolen through USB devices. 
• -39% were more concerned about the threat from their own employees than the threat 
from outside hackers. 
• -27% admitted they did not know the trends of data loss incidents over the past few years.  
(Cisco, 2008, p. 1) 
The threat from the outside is still very much real.  Employee behavior internally on a network 
mixed with technology is also proving to be damaging and can open doors to the insider for an 
outsider.  Educating IT professionals on the seriousness of this new threat and educating 
employees on how their behavior could negatively impact an organization or its customers can 
only help strengthen the overall security structure. 
 The “insider” is defined differently depending on how an organization may want to 
address the issue.  There are two basic opinions on who the insider is.  Some organizations 
believe the insider to be an employee intent on maliciously attacking the organization.  This is an 
older version of who the insider historically was.  With recent technological and business 
changes, IT professionals should consider a second angle regarding who the insider truly is.  The 
insider is, “…not just the rogue employee, but rather every employee and every device that 
stores information.” (Cisco, 2008, p. 1)  The malicious employee is dangerous but the accidental 
behavior is more commonly harmful.  The malicious employee sets out to cause harm for many 
reasons, all reasons ultimately being a personal reason.  When considering confidentiality, 
integrity, and accountability, IT professionals should consider the “accidental” insiders and 
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whether or not the organization’s culture supports this negligent behavior or whether it 
proactively helps prevent negligent behavior.   
Do employees truly understand the possible consequences of their actions on the network?  
Most all employees have heard of the dangers, but how many believe it couldn’t happen to, or 
because of, them?  The InsightExpress study found that, “…a lack of awareness, a lack of 
diligence, and defiance within company ranks pose a significant insider threat to data.” (Cisco, 
2008, p. 2) A common assumption among IT professionals is that employees truly understand 
how a computer and a network work and what appropriate activity is as opposed to inappropriate 
activity.  Many employees use computers and the Internet at home, not just in the workplace.  
Neither having a PC or laptop for daily job functions and/or a PC or laptop at home for personal 
use, guarantees an employee is aware of threats and vulnerabilities.  Of the IT professionals 
surveyed, 43% said they are not educating employees well enough and 19% said they have not 
communicated the security policy to employees well enough.  (Cisco, 2008, p. 2) Expecting 
professionalism and common sense cannot be relied on.  Many times people are overheard 
sharing sensitive information about themselves, their employer, or even a customer.  How many 
actually lock up or log off of their PC or laptop when walking away?  Passwords are used several 
times a day to access sensitive data – how many people still record these passwords and leave 
them in an easily targeted location?  Many employees today carry a laptop and use mobile phone 
to complete daily job functions.  How many laptops and mobile devices have been lost or stolen? 
• Nine percent of employees reported that they have lost or had their corporate device 
stolen. 
• Of those employees who reported loss or theft of a corporate device, 26 percent 
experienced more than one incident in the past year. 
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• The top concern among IT professionals regarding data leakage was the use of USB 
devices, with 33 percent sharing this concern globally.  The number-two concern was 
email; 24 percent of global IT respondents shared this view. 
• When asked why their employees are less diligent in safeguarding intellectual property, 
48 percent of IT professionals responded that employees are dealing with more 
information than ever before, and 43 percent listed a growing apathy toward security 
stemming from the quickening pace of employees’ jobs. 
(Cisco, 2008, p. 3) 
Why this lack of awareness by users and how their activity could be potentially harmful, 
and why this lack of awareness by IT professionals as to the actual level of knowledge by 
employees?  The perimeter has always been the focus, but now there are new doors and windows 
discovered everyday by hackers.  The time has come to, “…contemplate the role of existing 
norms in influencing what should be moving forward…to include how, for example, political, 
cultural, and economic systems shape and interact with technical systems and what this suggests 
for information assurance and security ethics.”  In the book, Information Assurance and Security 
Ethics in Complex Systems, several technology specialists included articles regarding ethics, 
culture, and the need to change because of the changes information technology has brought in to 
the world.  The idea portrayed by the authors is that ethics are learned and built by those in 
society.  Ethics and laws are a required part of having a secure and productive organization. 
“Being ethical is not just a matter of what one (individual or organization) does, but who or what 
they are.  This “take” is a sense of the cultures and values that guide them.  It emerges from the 
people in the organization and what they sense of the culture and values that guide them.” (Dark, 
2011, p. 47)  The overall theme is that ethics are cultural (organizationally and by country) as 
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well as created and learned by the society that creates the ethics followed.  There are the ethical 
standards of an organization and the ethical standards of the world.  These standards have 
reached a point where inspection and reinvention are needed.  “Organizations crossing 
boundaries must not only be sensitive to local laws, but must institute policies that will allow 
them to successfully interface with local populations…organizations will be able to better 
formulate information security polices given enhanced understanding of differences in cultural 
norms specific to information security.”  (Dark, 2011, p. 56) This same article goes on to discuss 
how there are guidelines and templates made available to organizations by groups such as the 
SANS Institute and ISO 27002 – but neither of these addresses the differences global 
employment brings to organizational culture.  One strongly held belief is that organizational 
culture can influence, positively or negatively, the ethical behavior of employees.  Other factors 
to consider regarding ethical behavior include economic and political climates.  It is suggested 
that, “as researchers investigate the effectiveness of information security policy, [look] at the 
many factors that can influence a person’s interpretation, including user expectations, user 
experiences, and culture.” (Dark, 2011, p. 73) 
 Distributing user acceptance policies to employees has been a standard amongst the 
business community.  The ideology now is that it is time be become proactive.  Currently used 
technological tools are primarily reactive.  A firewall is used to control incoming and outgoing 
traffic, as well as routers.  Switches can be used to isolate specific areas of access from those 
who should not have access.  Intrusion Detection Systems can be put in place to monitor the 
network and report suspicious activity.  Intrusion Protection Systems can help monitor the 
network and control access to the network.  These, however, are mostly reactive.  Each device 
needs to be programmed to look for specific information.  Once the information is received the 
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task is then to identify the perpetrator.  Could this perpetrator have been identified before the 
attack? 
 An insider could have intentionally behaved maliciously, or could have taken actions that 
led to an accidental intrusion.  The debate is whether or not an insider could be identified prior to 
an incident.  Since there are essentially two types of insiders (the malicious insider and the 
accidental insider) considerations in security need to be addressed from two different angles. 
The malicious insider is the insider thought of most often.  “Employees with a spiteful agenda 
and a profit motive can use their insider status to engage in activities that cause even greater 
financial loss than external threats.” (Cisco, 2008, p. 3)  Also referred to as disgruntled 
employees, the malicious insider has an advantage – already being on the inside.  Knowing the 
internal organizational network structure, and depending on what access levels this employee 
may have, changes could be made in favor of the malicious insider allowing damage to be done.  
In the 2008 Cisco study performed by InsightExpress, 20% of the IT professionals surveyed said, 
“…disgruntled employees were their biggest concern in the insider threat arenas.” (Cisco, 2008, 
p. 3) Access controls are the most commonly used control in regards to insider access levels, but 
this is proving to no longer be enough. “What stops someone who has legitimate access to a file 
from emailing it to someone who should not have access?  Not only do you have to strictly 
control access, you must also monitor it.” (Cole, 2011, p. 4) 
 The accidental insider is any employee who, as discussed, accidentally opens a door for 
attack via social engineering, malware, or a lack of understanding the reasons behind specific 
security policies that have been set.  The fact that the insider is now as great a threat as the 
outsider, IT professionals believe this threat needs attention and addressing.  Current security 
architectures do a good job of protecting organizations data from the outsider.  An employee 
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does not need to be a technical expert to cause damage.  The information is available to anyone, 
and with a minimal amount of privileges and/or the knowledge of someone with necessary 
privileges, could provide a large enough crack in the foundation for an insider to squeeze 
through.  Too much permission or too much freedom or the network could allow the accidental 
insider to create a crack big enough for the latest adware, malware, virus, work, or Trojan to find 
its way in.  Research has been done to demonstrate indicators of an insider.  This information can 
be used to add to the current practices used to develop a new strategy.  
 The accidental insider is easier to identify and address than the malicious insider.  The 
accidental insider can be any employee, anywhere, at any time.  The malicious insider takes 
more monitoring to identify.  Both types of insider threats can be addressed with educating the 
entire organization regarding both, how to be safe, what to look for, and how to handle an insider 
threat if suspected.  There is an inherent trust between employer and employee, and between co-
workers and peers.  Educating that trust is still pertinent but also educating to keep an eye out for 
suspicious activity can lead to a change in the organizational culture.  Being a part of a global 
business world also leaves desire for educating all employees about each other culturally and 
ethically.  Once understood, the organizational culture needs to be a part of daily business life for 
all employees no matter what region the employee works from.  Current practices need to be 
better, and then enhanced with additional educational measures. 
 Many professionals have written and recommended new actions to follow to protect 
against the insider.  One common theme for all recommendations is education.  In his book, 
“Enemy at the Water Cooler,” Brian T. Contos begins chapter 3 by saying, “There is no piece of 
technology that once deployed will solve all of an organization’s security problems.  Security 
encompasses people, process, and technology.  By finding the right combination of these, an 
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organization can successfully reduce risk.”  This point is true – technology is not the only factor 
to be considered – policy should be strengthened and people’s actions, morals, and beliefs need 
to be addressed.  Enterprise Security Management is a complex venture that should be taken in 
today’s business climate.  Contos shares that security management should still encompass 
current recommended practices (event collection, asset relevance, active and watch lists, data 
content, anomaly detection, false-positive reduction, real-time analysis, forensic analysis, and 
remediation, just to name a few, as well as reducing risk, reducing response time, better data and 
reporting, and actionable information, repeatable and measurable incident management, 
remaining compliant and detecting and responding to attacks as a Return on Security 
Investments (ROSI).  This can all be done by the organization itself, outsourced, or even co-
sourced. (Contos, 2006, p. 97)  There are known holes in making the route chosen to work 
successfully.  Recent research has found that, “…a common factor in insider espionage is that in 
most cases damage could have been prevented by timely and effective action to address the 
anger, pain anxiety, or psychological impairment of perpetrators, who exhibited signs of 
vulnerability or risk well in advance of the crime of abuse.” (Dark, 2011, p. 135)  This remains 
one focus of research – how to identify attack related behaviors before the attack occurs. 
 Another focus in research has pointed to the reasons current practices are no longer as 
effective as in the past regarding the average employee – overall, the focus has become one of 
policy effectiveness.  Cisco’s survey conducted by InsightExpress demonstrated that the greatest 
concern is, “…the importance of a comprehensive security policy approach that includes 
education and accountability,” (Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 2) and without a renewed focus on 
education and accountability the current architectures of security will continue to fail regarding 
the insider threat.  The methods currently used fail to appropriately communicate security 
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policies to employees.  Keeping in mind that many large organizations now employ globally, the 
global environment should be considered in developing and communicating security policies.  In 
the Cisco study, 75% of the companies surveyed had security policies.  Of the employees 
surveyed 40% did not know the policies existed and 20% of the IT professionals were unaware 
of the existing policies. 
 
Figure 3 Disconnect Between End User and IT Security Policy Awareness 
Note.  From Cisco Data leakage worldwide (Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 3) 
  
Figure 3 demonstrates that there is a major disconnect between policy makers and the 
employees who are to follow policy.  The study found reasons for this disconnect is due to a lack 
of communication: 
• 11 percent of employees say that security policies were never communicated to them or 
that they were never educated about the policy. 
• Europe had the highest prevalence of this belief, where the United Kingdome (25 
percent) and France (20 percent) far exceed the global average. 
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• Germany also has a high percentage of employees who claim that IT never 
communicates security policies to them (16 percent). 
(Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 3) 
This lack of communication occurs in several instances: 
• 56 percent of IT professionals report that security policies are communicated to new hires 
during orientation, yet only 32 percent of employees say they were educated. 
• In Japan, 66 percent of IT professionals claim they communicate security policies to 
every new hire, but only 35 percent of employees say they received that information. 
• The United States had an even larger gap (42 percent) with 70 percent of IT professionals 
claiming that security policies are communicated to new hires and only 28 percent of the 
American employees saying they received these briefings. 
(Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 3) 
  Why such a large report of lack of communication was also revealed.  It was 
found that updated security policies are often shared via email.  The receipt of these emails was 
confirmed by 59% of employees and 68% of IT professionals, but the potential for missing or 
deleting this message is high due to the amount of email communication, sent and received daily.  
Another factor mentioned, emails don’t always communicate the importance and that delivery in 
person is often more effective.  A third finding points to a lack of compliance or enforcement of 
the policies. “…More than half of the employees surveyed admitted that they do not abide by 
their company’s security policies.  France featured the highest percentage (14%) of employees 
who admitted they adhere to policy sometimes, hardly at all, or never.  India wasn’t far behind, 
with 11% admitting that they hardly ever or never abide by corporate policies.”  (Cisco Systems, 
2008, p. 4) Only a portion of countries have been included in table 8.  The results demonstrate 
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the beliefs between IT professionals and employees about the current Security culture in 
organizations. 
• Only 22 percent of IT professionals believe that security education needs to be improved.  
A greater number of IT professionals believe that employees are wayward because they 
don’t understand the risks of their behavior, because security is not a top-of-mind 
priority, or because they simply don’t care.  When asked why they altered security 
settings on computers to view unauthorized sites, for example 52 percent simply replied 
that they wanted to view the site – regardless of its conflict with corporate policy. 
• IT’s perception of employee apathy is highest in France (57 percent), which parallels the 
French employee acknowledgement that they often ignore company policies.   
• In China, 77 percent of IT professionals said security is not a tip-of-mind concern for 
employees. 
• Many IT professionals (41 percent) believe that employees are willing to engage in these 
risky behaviors because they think that IT will solve any problems that arise as a result or 
that no one will know. 
• The most common reason given why employees do not adhere to corporate security 
policies is a lack of alignment between job activities that are perceived as necessary and 
policy constraints.  Forty-two percent of employees worldwide knowingly disregard 
security policies because they believe that the policies limit their ability to perform their 
work effectively.  China (62 percent) and the United Kingdom (55 percent) featured the 
highest percentages of employees expressing this frustration. 
• Despite the fact that employees often violate security policies, IT professionals do not 
confront employees very often.  About three out of four respondents say they deal with 
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employees who violate their company’s IT policy a few times a year or less frequently.  
In Australia, only 10 percent of IT respondents say they confront employees once a 
month or more often. 
(Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 5-6) 
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Table 8 
 Reasons for Violating Corporate IT Policy 
Reasons Total (n=776) US (n=76) BRA (n=85) FRA (n=75) CHN (n=92) JPN (n=61) IND (n=77) 
They do not think there is enough 
risk to be concerned 47% 51% 44% 41% 59% 49% 51% 
They think IT is there to protect 
them if something goes wrong 41% 39% 36% 33% 47% 38% 52% 
Security is just not top-of-mind 
for them 39% 34% 29% 31% 77% 25% 38% 
They do not care 38% 38% 21% 57% 34% 49% 39% 
They do not know about or 
understand the policy 34% 30% 35% 43% 45% 41% 35% 
They do not know that security is 
a concern for IT 33% 28% 22% 24% 59% 30% 36% 
They are in a hurry 25% 29% 24% 27% 17% 13% 38% 
We need to create or improve our 
employee education and training 
programs 22% 21% 27% 5% 40% 30% 44% 
Other 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 0% 
Don't know/not sure 2% 4% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
Note. From Cisco: Data leakage worldwide (Cisco Systems, 2008, p. 5) 
 
Employees will not adhere to policy when they feel it interferes with their daily work 
functions, or when they simply felt they had the right for personal reasons.  This behavior can 
lead to an accidental attack mostly due to the misunderstanding of why the policy is set as it is.  
The insider may behave maliciously in this manner for personal reasons, many times due to 
anger or frustration with a co-worker or manager.  IT professionals responded to the survey that 
they rarely confront those who may be intentionally or unintentionally breaking policy. (Cisco 
Systems, 2008, p. 6)  Overall, the Cisco survey identified that a change in enforcement of 
security policies needs to change.  Policies that work should be created, consequences to 
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violations need to be enforced, employees need to be educated as to what the policies are and the 
consequences of violating them, and in the end, and these consequences need to be enforced.  
This change will require a change in current security culture’s and leadership.  All of this will 
require time and attention by leadership.  
 Several Information Technology specialists have recommended models on how to 
incorporate the insider threat into the current best practices.  In 1999, Dorothy E. Denning wrote 
about the growing threat of information warfare in her book titled, “Information Warfare and 
Security.”  A small section is devoted to security awareness and training discussing that a major 
vulnerability is people and a major point of warfare is education.  Denning writes, “Security 
awareness and training programs can serve to inform employees about their organizations 
information security policy, to sensitize them to risks and potential losses, and to train them in 
the use of security practices and technologies…Employees can be made aware of social 
engineering tactics and how to detect and avoid them.  System administrators can be trained in 
information security so that they can properly configure and monitor systems.  They and other 
staff members can be instructed in their responsibilities regarding information security practices 
and incidents.” (Denning, 1999, p. 382)  In 1999, several practices were already in place to 
educate computer users.  Universities were initiating programs.  The University of Delaware 
required students to pass a test about its computer-use policy before receiving a password to 
access the University’s network.  Cornell University requires students to complete a course on 
the use of campus computers before receiving access to the network.  Penn State University 
sends students caught misusing the network to a similar class about the appropriate use of 
computers on the University network.  The University of Michigan made use of posters around 
campus warning students about things to be wary of using the network.  Students, however, felt 
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the tests and campaign strategies were not enough.  It was reported that much of the information 
was obvious and felt like a waste of time.  What students felt was most effective was learning 
about Information Warfare.  These courses taught users/students how vulnerabilities were 
exposed.  “The lesson to be learned here is that it is not enough to tell users how to behave – they 
must understand and appreciate the reason behind the rules.” (Denning, 1999, p. 383) Similar 
programs have been offered to consumers including the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission website to inform Internet users how to identify scams.  The Federal Trade 
Commission in the United States also offers a program to educate consumers about web scams.  
(Denning, 1999, p. 384)  However, neither of these programs is required, and it is up to the user 
to be motivated to use these programs for educational purposes.  Most of her book addresses 
technological approaches to security – encryption, analysis, monitoring, cryptography, intrusion 
detection, and access controls.  Though discussed in 1999 by Denning, the recent study 
performed by Cisco via InsightExpress reveals that there is still a lack of education regarding 
why a user’s behavior could negatively impact an organization. 
 Another study performed in the United Kingdom by the Network Research Group also 
demonstrates the lack of end-user concern regarding security policy.  Two questionnaires were 
distributed to 58 companies willing to participate.  The questionnaires were distributed to gather 
knowledge of the IT team’s belief of the infrastructure and a second to identify the user’s 
awareness to the access to systems, company security and personal opinions.  Some common IT 
infrastructure uses were found – all respondents used anti-virus software, maintained backups, 
and required the use of passwords.  Only five of none administrators that completed the 
questionnaire claimed to have formal policies in place, and only 44% of the IT respondents had a 
strategy for dealing with an external attack.  Only 2/3 of the companies surveyed educated 
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employees about security issues and this was rated by all as low priority.  The results of the 
survey also showed that the administrators considered employee actions more of an issue than 
technical security issues – however, as previously stated, education and awareness were low on 
the list of priorities.  The main reason reported by the administrators for the lack of attention was 
budgetary.  Two-thirds of the respondents reported less than 1% of the annual budget was used 
for security, and no respondent claimed more than five percent of the budget allocated for 
security.  The greatest belief of administrators as to why such a small amount was allocated to 
security is a lack of support from senior management- by 45% of the respondents. (Finch, 
Furnell, & Dowland, 2003) 
 The end user questionnaire revealed more details regarding password usage, 42% 
admitted to using personal information to create a password, but only 4 out of 50 end users 
admitted that they realized this made password guessing easier, while the rest felt this was not of 
concern.  Twenty-two percent of the end user respondents admitted they would open an email 
attachment even if the sender was unknown.  This is a large enough number to be concerned with 
the potentiality of an attack by infection.  Both of these topics demonstrate a lack of knowledge 
by end users on the company’s networks.  Security policy was also addressed in the end user 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire addressed whether end users were required to sign a security 
policy, keeping in mind that four of the surveyed companies didn’t even have a security policy.  
Of the thirty four respondents that could have signed one that was in existence, a total of thirty-
four, only six reported having signed one.  Of the fifty users surveyed total, only six had actually 
reported being required to sign a security policy, and of those 6 only 3 referred to the policy on a 
regular basis.  “This clearly indicates that merely having a policy and getting users to sign up to 
it is an inadequate means of ensuring that it will actually mean anything to them.  Organizations 
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need to take more proactive steps, such as education and training (which the earlier administrator 
results acknowledged was lacking) in order to improve understanding.” (Finch et al., 2003, p. 8)  
In this same survey, administrators and end-users were asked to rank a list of threats in order of 
perceived danger.  A disconnect is demonstrated between administrators and end-users when 
considering risks in table 9. 
Table 9 
Comparison of administrator and user views  
Threat Admin Rank User Rank 
Employee errors in computer software/hardware use 1 4 
Viruses 2 1 
Employee actions that are intentionally harmful 2 2 
Physical Theft (e.g. notebook theft) 4 6 
Internet and Intranet connection 5 5 
Harmful Intrusion from outside 6 3 
 
Note. From Assessing IT security culture: System administrator and end-user perspectives (Finch et al., 2003, p. 9) 
Administrators were more concerned about employee errors than the users, 
demonstrating that the users were less aware of the risks their actions could have on the network.  
These results demonstrate a need for awareness education.  “The most significant point is that a 
company cannot rely on the security message to spread itself…there was clear scope for 
improvement of security, and associated awareness, within all of the respondent companies 
promoting security amongst end-users goes beyond simply having a security policy (although 
this is a necessary starting point).  Ongoing reinforcements of the issue need to be given more 
attention.” (Finch et al., 2003, p. 9) 
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2.4 - Suggestions on How to Address the Insider Threat 
Professionals have focused attention on the fact that education and awareness are lacking 
when it comes to computer and network security just as many professionals have offered their 
versions of a good model to follow.  Many still only offer technical solutions.  A proper way to 
include education has not completely been included.  Recommendations have been made by 
many, but in order to successfully implement a model, a deeper understanding of where an 
organization is regarding security policy and awareness is necessary.  Before jumping into any 
specific model a holistic approach should be made by each organization to determine areas of 
strengths and weaknesses in the current architecture used.  With the intrinsic need to rethink 
business security architecture, a baseline approach may need to be taken by many organizations. 
In a white paper published by IDC, and sponsored by RSA, the security division of EMC, 
the belief that, “…organizations should look at insider risk as a holistic problem that requires a 
holistic solution… to identify the framework of policies, procedures, and best practices needed to 
effectively address the problem.”  (Burke & Christiansen, 2009, p. 1)  This study by IDC and 
RSA revealed that the numbers of unintentional damaging actions are on the rise and now more 
threatening than those that are intentional.  Research showed that organizations experienced an 
average of 14.4 incidents of unintentional data loss due to employee negligence over the span of 
twelve months – this averages at least one incident per month.  Allowing users personal use of 
the Internet raises the vulnerability of malware and spyware attacks.  Eighty percent of legitimate 
websites now contain malware.  URL filtering can no longer keep up with this growing 
phenomenon.  In 2009, Microsoft reported an estimate of more than one million websites being 
compromised each month.  The global economy is also proving to impact insider threats 
demonstrated by the increase in internal fraud.  (Burke & Christiansen, 2009, p. 1-2)  See 
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appendix B for figures on reported internal incidents per year and incidents by country.  
Appendix B also includes findings of the IDC and RSA regarding the financial impact per region 
of the insider risks.  In Table 10, the research found that the overall greatest risk to organizations 
is the insider also includes contractors and temporary staff, as well as internal IT administrators 
and technical staff.   
Table 10 
 Insider Risks: Accidental versus Deliberate (% of Respondents)  
 
Note.  From Insider risk management: A framework approach to internal security (Burke & Christiansen, 2009, p. 1-2)   
 
The IDC and the RSA, after performing this current research recommends the following  
Framework is followed: 
1. Risk assessment should be the first priority. Organizations must understand the scope of the 
problems and prioritize remediation through policy and procedure and identify key security 
controls around network, access, data, applications, and audit. 
Insider Risks: Accidental Versus Deliberate (% of Respondents)    
 Total 
Predominantly 
Deliberate 
Predominately 
Accidental Equal Not sure 
Contractors and temporary staff 19.5 13.3 23.3 16.7 27.3 
Permanent employees 12.7 13.3 13.2 12.3  
Management/executive team 9.1 8.4 9.3 7.9 18.2 
Technical staff, including IT administrators 14.1 22.9 9.3 17.5 9.1 
Line-of-business staff (nontechnical) 9.1 14.5 7.9 6.1 27.3 
Remote employees 13.2 8.4 13.7 17.5  
Business partners 7.7 8.4 6.2 10.5 9.1 
Outsourcers 13.2 10.8 15 10.5 9.1 
Other 1.4  2.2 0.9  
Valid n =  440 83 227 114 11 
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2. Review and update information security policy on an annualized basis. For the sake of 
auditors and regulators, thoroughly document any changes and underlying reasoning; ensure the 
policy clearly demonstrates enforcement of security controls, such as data and access controls, as 
well as monitoring and reporting capabilities; and an update the policy to include new threats 
such as spyware, malware, social networking, etc. 
3. Educate employees on policy changes. Consider making security education a required element 
in annual performance reviews.  Automate employee notification of violations, reiterate policy, 
and log all incidents. 
4. Define insider threats by determining the value of customer accounts, intellectual property, 
confidential financial information, employee data, executive communications and other 
confidential information to the firm.  Calculate the cost of this data and the impact if it is 
exposed, leaked to competitors, and/or corrupted. 
5. Classify and search for all high-risk data, determine where the data is and if it is secure in its 
current location, and determine which individuals are accessing it and if their access is 
appropriate.  With full consideration for avoiding disruptions to critical business practices, 
consider data loss prevention and other data controls to protect and enforce policy on the data 
itself (such as quarantining data from being emailed, deleting data from endpoints, encrypting) 
and not just protecting the location (e.g. laptops, PDAs, databases, file servers). 
6. Audit all active internal user accounts — employees, contractors, partners, customers and 
other legitimate account holders.  Expunge the dead accounts (up to 50-60% of accounts in 
poorly managed environments) and, in some cases for contractors and other semi regular 
workers, freeze inactive accounts. 
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7. Provide strong security controls for all your internal users (not just remote users) to access 
network and critical information in order to ensure that only legitimate users are accessing 
corporate resources.  This also provides audit ability for any investigation or remediation activity 
following a breach. 
8. Identify high-risk internal users, such as system administrators, users with access to critical 
business applications or customer data, job leavers, users turned down for promotion, etc., 
monitor and review their activity on a regular basis, such as log-in attempts, and correlate that 
activity.  Develop and test an incident/event management plan for prompt remediation. 
9. Reconcile the access privileges of all users, starting with high-risk users, for their current role 
and job description, and immediately revoke excessive privileges.  This is especially important 
for contractors and temporary staff who are generally given the same access rights as permanent 
employees when they don’t need it. 
10. Implement regulatory reporting on compliance with a focus on internal security policy and 
meeting key performance metrics. 
11. Make all these steps a continuous process with regular reports on any exceptions sent to IT, 
compliance officers, risk officers, HR, and senior management (Burke & Christiansen, 2009, p. 
16) 
IDC writes, “…organizations should adopt a framework of technologies that manage internal 
risks across the entire infrastructures (such as endpoints, networks, applications, databases, 
storage, etc).  Technologies include encryption, information classification and discovery, identity 
management and assurance, data loss prevention, and security and event information 
management.” (Burke & Christiansen, 2009, p. 18)  Most of the recommended actions by the 
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IDC include best practices already in place, but an important step was added – educate 
employees. 
Another approach suggested is a predictive model framework.  This approach involves 
surveillance of employees to help predict an insider threat.  This model addresses the insider and, 
“…members of an organization authorized to access its information system, data, or network 
with a degree of trust by the organization and who accepts a commensurate level of scrutiny by 
the organization to deter possible abuse of these privileges.” (Greitzer et al., 2009, p. 6)  
Predictive modeling addresses behavior modeling and how it can be used to predict insider 
activity as an actual threat.  The idea is that even though it is difficult to predict who will actually 
perform intentionally malicious acts, it can help in the monitoring and discovery of malicious 
and non-malicious activity.  Studies have identified twelve psychosocial indicators of insider 
threat. (See Appendix B)  This method relies on observational/management reporting relying on 
personnel data and judgments that are likely to be available from management and human 
resources staff. (Dark, 2011, p. 151)  Several points are emphasized regarding this model:  
• The indicators need to be empirically tested or vetted with larger samples of HR experts 
and managers to assess their validity, at least at a subjective level. 
• The judgments based on observations will necessarily always be subjective – there is no 
expectation that an objective test instrument will emerge from this research. 
• Nevertheless, we believe that with appropriate training, management and HR personnel 
would better understand the nature of the threat and the likely precursors or threat 
indicators that may be usefully reported to cyber security officers. 
• Most importantly, the approach in predictive modeling is to proved “leads” for cyber 
security officers to pursue in advance of actual crimes, without which they would likely 
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have little or no insight with which to select higher-risk ‘persons of interest” on which to 
focus analyses. 
“For security analysis purposes, only cases where a manager is ‘highly concerned’ about such 
factors or combinations of factors would be advanced in the predictive model to raise the level of 
concern or risk.  As the risk level increases, so too would the level of monitoring and analysis on 
an individual increase.” (Dark, 2011, p. 150-151) 
 Should behavioral warning signs be addressed proactively to prevent harm to the 
organization?  Would the collection of psychosocial data violate employee trust or legal 
guidelines?  If behavioral data are to be monitored, what type of data should be acquired?  
Considering the devastating effect of a false accusation on an employee, what are the 
implications of the predictive approach?  Due to the social and ethical issues this model brings to 
the surface further research and development is necessary, but the underlying ideology that an 
informed and enlightened organization requires some new approaches by human resources and 
management in order to properly maintain awareness of worker satisfaction and well-being – 
often a precursor to malicious behavior. (Greitzer et al., 2009, p. 17) 
 Others have offered suggestions on preventing and reacting to an insider attack.  A model 
addressed, A Systems Dynamic Model, based on the malicious insider using the Tim 
Lloyd/Omega Case. This model is based on the idea that insider attacks occur when the insider 
perceives the system as being extremely vulnerable.  (Melara, Sarriegui, Gonzalez, Sawicka, & 
Cooke, 2003, p. 8)  Per the research into this model, security should not be based on 
implementing technical methods, formal controls also need to be in place and enforced.  These 
technical and formal controls need to be supported with educational and training programs to 
help the employee understand:  
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• How the system works (or should work), 
• The kind of risks that are posed to the information system, 
• The three different aspects security must cover, 
• The role that each employee plays in securing the system, 
• The legislative sanctions to intentional misuse of information systems and enterprise-
owned data (it is usually a good deterrent of insider attacks), and 
• The security tools or measures employees and managers should put in place at any time, 
especially when becoming aware of a specific risk. (Melara et al., 2003, p. 18) 
MITRE Corporation has also performed research to help, “…characterize and create analysis 
methods to counter sophisticated malicious insiders in the United States Intelligence 
Community.” (Maybury et al., 2005, p. 1) In this study, six months were spent studying 
prototype techniques developed to provide early warnings of insider activity. 
 Several mechanisms are already in use to help predict insider attacks.  Many 
organizations track employee access, utilize camera systems, and monitoring email usage, 
signature based detection monitors for known types of attacks.  Monitoring for anomalies and 
misuse is another set of methods used.  In addition to these, policies are also set up.  Role Based 
Access Control controls access to areas of the network based on roles of the organization.  
Simulators have been designed to help gain real time activity to detect anomalies and misuse.  
Simulators, however, are another form of technology that can’t always be used to identify an 
insider. (Nellikar, 2010) 
 Another set of theories used to discuss information security and the effects of 
organizational, environmental, and behavioral factors on information security success include the 
protection-motivation theory, deterrence theory, and again, organizational behaviors.  Tejaswini 
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Heratch and H. Raghav Rao used these theories to investigate and demonstrate how 
organizational culture will positively or negatively affect the success of security policy.  These 
theories address the ideologies behind threats affecting individuals and organizations and the 
effect of deterrence on compliance.  “Security-related behaviors may be connected to an 
individual’s motivation to protect organizational information assets due to awareness and fear of 
the outside environment, as well as his/her closeness to the organization…employee commitment 
to organizational well-being.” (Herath & Rao, 2009, p. 109)  To test several hypotheses 
regarding employee behavior and compliance with security policy, research was performed to 
demonstrate importance in behavior and information security.  “Our results indicate the 
employees’ understanding of the severity of the threat significantly affects their concern 
regarding security breaches…that on average, employee perceived security breach certainty 
perceptions are low…that if employees believe that complying with policies is a hindrance to 
their day-to-day job activity, they are less likely to have favorable views towards security 
policies…that if employees perceive that their compliance behaviors have a favorable impact on 
the organization or benefit the organization, they are more likely to have more positive attitudes 
toward the security policies.” (Herath & Rao, 2009, p. 117)  Another finding in the study was 
that social influences are important in positively affecting employee behaviors.  “This suggests 
that beliefs regarding the expectations of superiors, peers, and IT personnel seem to have the 
most impact on employee security behaviors.  Not only the expectations of others, but also the 
perceived behavior of similar others, was found to be a significant contributor in employee 
intentions to comply with the policies.” (Herath & Rao, 2009, p. 118)  A third factor found in 
research was that if employees know there is likelihood that there will be consequences imposed 
with non-compliance they will behave more positively.  (Herath & Rao, 2009)  These factors 
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come from the organizational culture – how an employee has knowledge of organizational 
policies and perceives the importance of compliance to the organization.   
Organizations worldwide concur that with the globally expanding world of business via 
the use of the Internet and mobile devices a better approach to security architecture is needed.  
Research has proven that this changing environment now has a greater threat than previously 
thought – the insider.  IT professionals and end-users worldwide each holds different knowledge 
bases and understanding of security threats to an organization’s network.  The conclusion by 
professionals is that awareness and training in security policy about why the policy is in place to 
better control end-user behavior.  Without attention to policy, and the lack of importance placed 
on end-user behavior will only lead to greater incidents of security breaches due to insider 
activity.  Organizational policy and culture needs to change along with the changing business 
world in order to continue to provide the all important confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
expected of organizations today by consumers. 
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Chapter 3 – Project History and Methodology 
 
 While engaged in a discussion with managers, the topic about best practices in security 
came up.  A question posed regarded whether or not employees truly understood the reasoning 
behind security policy.  The managers seemed to feel that, yes, most employees understood and 
knew the difference between right and wrong when using company property such as desktops 
and PCs connected to the network, and how to appropriately act when using them.  The reasons 
behind security are common sense, right?  Knowing the behaviors of co-workers with the 
company network, some question the degree of understanding and whether the employee should 
be considered more of a threat.  Many larger corporations have security policies in place, but it 
seems the employees and partners are not all fully aware of the policies and/or reasoning behind 
it.  Daily, co-workers abuse security policy and corporate ethics.  New network based storage 
tools are being created to use the corporate network to store proprietary company information 
and customer information.  Being network based, this allows employees based around the world 
to work using the same software, storage networks and databases, as well as also allowing 
business partners around the world access to these same databases.  This architecture is great in 
being able to guarantee data that is used by anyone associated with the company, whether a 
direct employee or a partner, be the most accurate it can be, hence providing integrity as a 
business for its consumer.  This architecture also opens doors to new security issues concerning 
confidentiality and availability.  Would the currently used security policies protect against the 
insider?  Does the insider truly know right from wrong, especially with employees and partners 
being located around the world?  How much consideration has management teams taken in 
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regards to the insider?  If considered, how would an organization properly address the insider 
threat? 
 In order to investigate the true threat of the insider to organizations, a grounded theory, 
qualitative approach was chosen.  The first question that needed to be answered was regarding 
how much research had already been done regarding the true threat of the insider.  Based on the 
prior research done further observations could be recommended based on the already available 
data.  In the beginning the idea of surveying current employees of several organizations globally 
would help identify whether the insider should be considered a true threat.  Another topic to 
consider regarded how these same employees felt about the corporate security culture and how 
the policies are enforced.  It was discovered that many surveys similar to this had already been 
conducted by several trustworthy organizations such as the NIST, CERT, and even corporations 
such as Cisco.  When comparing data these organizations had already published, it was decided 
that another survey was not necessary and that the already collected data, being current and 
similar in results, could be used to answer the questions posed about the insider threat. 
 A collection of research, studies, and previously published thesis reports was gathered 
from sources such as CERT, the NIST, the ACM, and the IEEE.  Also researched were writings 
published by information technology and security experts via journals, textbooks, technology 
magazines, and blogs.  The consensus for years seems to be that the insider is a true threat.  
There were common definitions of what the insider threat truly is, but not all were the same.  A 
disconnect between whether the insider should be considered in only malicious situations or 
whether the insider could also be anyone who unintentionally caused damage was noted.  The 
first question found that a good definition of what an insider is would help confirm the direction 
an organization needs to take in security. 
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 After reviewing published literature and data, a comparison was made as to what each 
organization and researcher found considering the true threat posed by the insider.  Much of the 
information discovered similar information, whether based on small or large subject groups.  
There is a true threat from the insider in this global corporate internetworking culture.  Research 
also demonstrated the reasons employees shared for not complying with security policy no 
matter the region.  Some regions held a general malaise regarding confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability making it important for organizations to make considerations regarding this malaise 
and the vulnerabilities that could arise because of it. 
 The final step was to compare information from the collected data and research.  Once 
compared disconnects was found including current security policies and enforcement.  Much of 
the techniques used were still technological.  Using the technologies available to secure a 
network follow many of the currently followed best practices recommended for organizations to 
protect the networks involved and to comply with laws and regulations designed to protect the 
consumer.  The commonly found missing factor in security policy is that the insider threat is not 
fully addressed but should be.  Enforcement of policy is also lacking.  This led back to my 
original thought – that employees have a lack of understanding of how their actions could 
negatively affect the organization’s network.  Current best practices can help in protection 
against the insider only minimally.  Best practices need to be revamped to include education and 
enforcement. 
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Chapter 4 – Project Analysis 
 
“The big lie of computer security is that security improves by imposing complex passwords on 
users.  In real life, people write down anything they can’t remember.  Security is increased by 
designing for the way humans actually behave.” 
 -Jakob Nielson 
“The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence; it is to act with yesterday’s 
logic.” 
 -Peter Drucker 
 
 The insider threat is no longer a threat to be ignored.  Current best practices are not 
enough to tackle all the vulnerabilities opened up to an organization by the insider.  Common 
ground exists amongst organizations on many levels regarding the importance of protecting a 
network from the dangers the Internet has brought to the business world.  The business world is 
now a global culture.  This global influence has created environments that now exist internally to 
an organization, but also outside the perimeter.  The historical walls of security that existed have 
been torn down making the world of security a different reality.  When a world or environment 
changes the old ways of the community also change.  Keeping the current security architecture 
based on best practices will help keep an organization secure, but no longer is the organization 
secure enough.   
 Change is never easy.  In the information technology world it has been clearly 
demonstrated and recognized that a change is necessary, but this change has not occurred.  Many 
reasons will keep an organization from making change.  Time and cost are just a couple reasons 
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mentioned by organizations for the lack of change.  Data continues to be captured, however, that 
the insider threat is growing as quickly as the technology that opens up the windows of 
opportunity to the insider, but the business world is not keeping up.  A formal review of current 
best practices needs to be made, and weaknesses regarding the insider need to be addressed. 
 Current literature demonstrates how current technology is not enough to defend against 
the insider.  Large barriers exist in coming up with ways to defend against the insider.  Current 
technological practices cost time and money, but so does an attack.  Organizations have invested 
time and money in protection technologies based on common risk management techniques.  
Once in place, however, budgets are not set to continually support necessary changes, and if not 
supported changes aren’t made.  There is a comfort in the current ways used by organizations to 
guarantee confidentiality, integrity, and availability to customers and regulators.  Current 
expectations and regulations protect well against an outside attack, but what happens when 
insider attacks begin to outnumber attacks from the outside?  Being proactive can only help 
against future vulnerabilities and threats.  No longer can security remain as passive as it has 
historically. 
 Sun Tzu wrote hundreds of years ago to, “know your enemy.”  Information technologists 
have known the enemy and documented changes in attack.  The attack has normally come from 
the outsider, but research and documentation has been performed and demonstrates how attacks 
from the inside are taking the lead.  A holistic approach to information security should be 
adopted.  Business and technology remain the focus of the chosen weapons, but the battle is 
changing.  The focus no longer should remain on just technology but also the human aspect.  
This will involve several organizations working together – upper management teams, human 
resources, etc. 
THE INSIDER THREAT   54 
 
 Every organization functions differently so each organization faces different risks 
dependant on the business conducted.  Tools have been created that can be used by all, and these 
tools will still continue to work, but the question is posed whether they can be used in different 
ways in order to provide even better protection?  The best preventative actions to take include 
currently followed best practices as well as combining these with behavior and culture.  
Currently provided data demonstrates that behaviors by all employees, whether intentionally 
malicious or not, affect how easily an insider could infiltrate and inflict damage.  When assessing 
risks, organizations need to include the insider. 
 In 2009, CERT Software Engineering Institute published new and updated 
recommendations to best practices regarding the insider threat.  The 3rd Edition of “Common 
Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats” was funded by CyLab and 
published in 2009.  The research performed involved analysis of insider threat cases logged 
between the years 2003 and 2007.  Focusing on cases involving theft and fraud, CERT set out to 
identify behaviors and conditions that would identify the possibility of a malicious act occurring 
by an individual or groups of individuals.  Using the newer view towards insider crimes this 
information was used to provide information and recommendations to organizations on how to 
recognize and address the insider.  The changes recommended in CERT’s publication addresses 
how current practices can be adjusted to include the insider.  Referring to the recommendations 
made by CERT, and similar recommendations made by other professionals, I am recommending 
the use of current practices and adding education to help an organization defend against the 
insider. (Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, & Shimeall, 2009) 
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4.1 - Recommendations 
 Education is the key to successfully creating change.  Based on research performed 
employees stated several reasons for not following policy.  The time has come to reassess current 
policies and practices.  CERT’s research into the success of malicious insiders identifies reasons 
the insider was successful.  Most of the insider activity occurred while the person was still 
currently employed.  Only five of the seventy-seven analyzed cases involved were not currently 
employed.  The gender split was equal – half were male and half were female.  The majority held 
non-technical positions with the company.  The pattern identified was one of financial gain.  
Several situations existed.  Some cases involved a single insider, some involved collusion 
between the insider and someone else inside the company, and some cases included collusion 
between just insiders.  Insiders were paid by outsiders to collect or modify data for them; others 
committed the acts internally by abusing access and processes of the organization.  95% of the 
users stole or modified data during normal business hours, and over 75% used authorized access.  
Only sixteen percent of the crimes were initially designed using technical knowledge, 85% used 
their own password and 10% compromised someone else’s account by accessing via an 
unattended computer, using customer accounts, or social engineering schemes.  (Cappelli et al., 
2009, p. 18-19)  Detection was not able to be used to stop the insider prior to attack as this isn’t 
the common way to identify an issue.  CERT found that over 50% of the cases were detected 
internally by non-IT people, 26% by clients or customers of the organization, approximately 
10% by customers, and 5% by competitors…in most cases system logs were used to identify the 
insider.” (Cappelli et al., 2009, p. 20) 
 CERT’s “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats” 
summarizes sixteen best practices to follow: 
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• Practice #1: Consider threats from insiders and business partners in enterprise-wide risk 
assessments. 
• Practice #2: Clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls. 
• Practice #3: Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees. 
• Practice #4: Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruption behavior, beginning with the 
hiring process. 
• Practice #5: Anticipate and manage negative workplace issues. 
• Practice #6: Track and secure the physical environment 
• Practice #7: Implement strict password and account management policies and practices. 
• Practice #8: Enforce separation of duties and least privilege. 
• Practice #9: Consider insider threats in the software development life cycle. 
• Practice #10: Use extra caution with system administrators and technical or privileged 
users. 
• Practice #11: Implement system change controls. 
• Practice #12: Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions 
• Practice #13: Use layered defense against remote attacks. 
• Practice #14: Deactivate computer access following termination. 
• Practice #15: Implement secure backup and recovery processes. 
• Practice #16: Develop an insider incident response plan. 
(Cappelli et al., 2009) 
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Practice one, considering threats from insiders and business partners in enterprise risk 
assessments, and practice three, instituting periodic security awareness training for all 
employees, are two practices that are currently not focused on by organizations.  Practice two has 
also been demonstrated in studies, document and consistently enforce policies and controls.  
These three practices work together and it is necessary to continually examine practices and re-
examine to make necessary changes. 
 To begin, threats from insiders need to be included so re-examining current risks will be 
necessary to make adjustments.  In many organizations it may be necessary to convince top level 
management of this necessity.  Education may need to begin here in order to gain the support 
needed to be successful.  Most current policies will not need to be adjusted tremendously, but 
adjustments will need to be made making it necessary for a budget to include this time for 
adjustments.  Overall, the first step to successfully make changes will be to gain upper level 
approval and agreement, without this, current practices are unlikely to change.  Educational 
meetings may need to be held to persuade upper levels to the importance of the need.  Current 
practices will need to be explained in a way to demonstrate how the insider threat is growing and 
should now be added to security architecture.  Demonstrating how organizations similar to the 
one being addressed have been affected could help, along with presenting data to upper level 
management the data already gathered over the past several years regarding the growing threat.  
Once this is understood, the greatest data to present would be data on how the insider has 
affected the organization being addressed.  This will be the single most difficult task in 
addressing the insider threat.  It will take time and a group of employees to gather logs and 
statistics regarding the effects of the insider on the current organizational network security 
architecture.  In Chapter 2, literature on research conducted in the information security field has 
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been done to demonstrate that the culture of organizations does not fully support the insider 
threat, if at all.  Money and time have already been spent to develop currently followed practices 
that are working against the outsider – relevant data will be needed to convince upper levels of 
this change. 
 Education needs to be used to change organizational culture.  Many organizations, being 
global now, will need to tackle several legal, ethical, and cultural issues to accomplish this.  
While educating users about the new company culture they can also educate about ways to 
protect themselves and the organization.  Chapter 2 also demonstrated that employees do not 
comply with security policy.  Over time, the new community culture should change as all 
employees learn of the risk of the insider and the ways the insider can infiltrate the system.  
Education should not be focused on just non-technical employees – ALL employees at ALL 
levels should be required to receive training.   The management team is important when 
considering the organizational culture.  A factor in the successful organizational cultures is 
referred to as, “the tone at the top” by the writer’s of “Embedding Information Security into the 
Organization.”  (Johnson & Goetz, 2007, p. 17)  This article addresses the many challenges 
known by the Information Security community in managing and changing the culture of an 
organization regarding security.  It is believed that senior management involvement is essential, 
but the awareness needs to span all levels of the organization.   Knowing the importance of the 
information security to the organization is important, but it must also relay the importance of 
individual responsibility.  Another study performed in 2007 discusses how findings show that, 
“To ensure positive social pressure, top management, immediate supervisors and IS security staff 
should clearly and explicitly note the importance of complying with IS security policies.” 
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(Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007, p. 8)  All managers must be involved in the understanding 
and acceptance of the cultural change. 
 The type of training offered will also make a difference.  Practice two states that 
organizations should clearly document and enforce policies and controls.  Investigations into 
why users don’t comply to policy has shown that many employees believe that nothing will 
happen to them as these policies are not enforced.  Enforcement cannot strictly rely on training – 
something needs to come out of suspected bad behavior or it will continue as the policy will not 
be taken seriously.  The success of the policy will depend on employee acceptance.  “Individuals 
are influenced both by messages about expectations and the observed behavior of others.”  
Sometimes people consult the behavior of those around them to find out what to do.” (Herath & 
Rao, 2009, p. 113)  This study on protection motivation and deterrence found that, “… if an 
employee believes that his/her colleagues follow the organizational security polices, she/he is 
more likely to have positive intentions to follow them as well…studies have examined 
employees’ perceptions of the expectations of superiors, managers, and peers in relevant IS 
departments…and believes that the managers, IT personnel, or peers expect information security 
policy compliance, she/he is more likely to intent to comply.”(Herath & Rao, 2009, p. 113)  This 
is all part of the organizational culture – if the importance of information security isn’t enforced, 
all the policies in the world won’t persuade users from non-compliance.   
 Most employees will respond to minimal attention if suspected of non-compliance. 
Monitoring employees may depend on the role of each employee in the organization.  How this 
is done depends on the organization but several teams need to be put together to construct the 
proper enforcement policy.  This involves managers of teams, human resources, and legal teams.  
Issues come up regarding individual rights and policies, but organizational requirements for 
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compliance to protect business and its customers – at what point do the organization’s policies 
override rights of individuals?  This is one decision that needs to be made by several levels of the 
organization, and then shared with the organization’s population.  Just as between a child and 
parent, the technique chosen may be different, but without enforcement the child will not follow 
the rules because these rules, then, essentially do not really exist.  Enforcement policies can be 
reviewed periodically, but still requires enforcement.  Discussing the policy twice a year with 
employees is not enough.  When suspicious activity occurs it needs to be investigated and 
addressed. 
 Employees also need continuous reinforcement and training in security awareness 
considering how quickly the techniques used change.  New methods are discovered daily by 
hackers, but the average employee does not keep up on this information as it is released.  A 
minimum of once per year employees globally and at all levels, should be trained on what to 
watch for.  Who the organization considers to be the insider should be discussed.  Behavior traits 
should be shared with employees – the insider is not always who you may expect him/her to be.  
Also understanding personal individual behavior inside and outside the office is important.  
CERT has listed some behaviors to consider in Table 11. 
Table 11 
 Behaviors to look for 
• Threats against the organization or bragging about the damage one could do to the organization, 
• Association with known criminals or suspicious people outside of the workplace,  
• Large downloads close to resignation, 
• Use of organization resources for a side business, or discussions regarding starting a competing business with coworkers, 
• Attempts to gain employees’ passwords or to obtain access through trickery or exploitation of a trusted relationship (often 
called “social engineering”)(Cappelli et al., 2009, p. 39) 
Note. From CERT’s Common sense guide to prevention and detection of insider threats 
 
THE INSIDER THREAT   61 
 
Social networking and social engineering techniques need to be shared with employees to help 
all employees realize if it may be happening to them or someone they know.  A better 
understanding of responsibilities regarding personal usage of company and personal property on 
the network, such as password protection and Internet usage will only help.  Employees also 
need to be trained on the proper ways to report suspicious activity. Training should inform 
employees on how system activity is monitored in order for employees to fully understand the 
entire security process. (Cappelli et al., 2009)  Reinforcement methods include measures such as 
emails with updates and reminders of security policy and compliance, seminars and training 
sessions for review, posters and articles distributed among employees can also help.  The idea is 
to keep the importance of security and compliance in the regular day to day activities of each 
employee. 
 In addition to re-examining and re-vamping policies to address the insider threat and then 
educating the employees, continuous auditing needs to take place.  Organizations need to keep 
up with recent changes in the insider attack methods and examine current policy to make sure it 
continues to protect the organization properly.  Keeping in mind, “…how do you know if 
security initiatives and awareness are making a difference?  How should metrics cascade 
throughout the organization?  How can risk and security metrics be more closely tied to tactical 
and strategic decision making?”  (Johnson & Goetz, 2007, p. 21)   When measuring, a couple 
other questions need to be kept in mind, “Are the metrics really helping to reduce the risk?  Will 
they help save money next year? Will they add business value?” (Johnson & Goetz, 2007, p. 21)  
What measurements are used are dependent on the organizations need for monitoring – how has 
it been done in the past and is the measurement still appropriate to the organization’s needs?  Just 
as adjustments need to be made to IDS and IPS to protect the perimeter, patches and updates are 
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performed on systems and applications, so should adjustments be made to training and 
reinforcements.  Employees need to be continuously updated to the threats, changes made to 
policy, and changes to employee responsibility.  With proper training, the employee can become 
a great weapon against the insider threat. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
“The search for static security – in the law and elsewhere – is misguided.  The fact is security can 
only be achieved through constant change, adapting old ideas that have outlived their usefulness 
to current facts.” 
 -William Osler 
 Canadian physician, 1849-1919 
 
 Information security in the business world can no longer rely on tools.  The way business 
works today is more social than it ever has been before.  The Internet has allowed globalization 
to grow at tremendous speeds and business is now conducted around the world.  Businesses now 
keep pertinent and private information on computer systems rather than on paper.  These systems 
are accessed via networks interconnected via the Internet.   Business has made the world smaller 
than it has ever been.  New ways to communicate exist, as do new ways to steal and exploit 
information.  In some ways, theft and exploitation are now more powerful as it can occur from 
anywhere around the world at any point in time.  Physical and environmental security is no 
longer enough.  Communities hear every day from each other how someone or something has 
been exploited by an unknown attacker.  Many times, these attacks are successful because of 
unintentional, accidental actions taken by the unsuspecting victim.  Every person performing 
regular daily day to day activities could now open doors for an attack on anyone without even 
knowing it.  Educating users about these social changes can help protect businesses.   
 Cultural changes are the greatest concern in order to make education work.  Policies can 
be created but without education and enforcement the policies will prove to be a waste of time.  
“Will the new tools and laws we’ve described here put an end to all privacy invasions, unfair 
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misuse of personal information, copyright infringement, and identity theft?  No, perfect 
compliance is not the proper standard by which to judge laws or systems that help enforce them.  
Rather we should ask how to build systems that encourage compliance and maximize the 
possibility of accountability for violations.” (Weitzner et al., 2008, p. 87)  Security is never 
100%, but current protections are not going to be enough.  Organizational culture needs changes 
through education and enforcement.  For years this information has been discussed in 
management.  Studies have been done on what is missing in current practices and why it no 
longer is enough.  Being an organizational force, no longer are small policy group and 
technological tools going to be enough.  An article in the Journal of Organizational Change 
Management addressed this thought.  “Additionally, wisdom must be transferred throughout the 
organization.  This will not happen unless: 
• The concept of organizational wisdom is understood and valued throughout the 
organization; and 
• Organizational leadership, culture and structure are specifically focused toward 
facilitating its development and transfer.”(Bierly III, Kessler, & Christensen, 2000, p. 
613) 
The need for change exists and that has been demonstrated for years.  The ability to change will 
depend on all parts of an organization.  No longer can groups of an organization function 
separately, the involvement of all groups to combine and work together will be the key to 
successful change.  Gaining and maintaining the compliance of employees will involve 
education and reinforcement.  Without compliance the work done to change will not be worth the 
time.   
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 Change will take time and will not occur overnight.  Without considering several 
factors, including cultural influences by region, internal cultural influences, and employees’ 
personal traits, changes will not be effective.  “…70 percent of change programs fail because of 
lack of strategy and vision, lack of communication and trust, lack of top management 
commitment, lack of resources, lack of change management skills, resistance to change, etc.  
Research dealing with organizational change has mainly focused on organizational factors 
neglecting the person-oriented issues.” (Vakola, Tsaousis, & Nikolaou, 2004, p. 88)  Current best 
practices should not be neglected, but should now include social and psychological 
considerations.  All employees from the top down should be involved.  Educating users on 
security issues will help empower all end-users in protecting sensitive information.  The outsider 
now has a new way inside, via mistakes made by those who are already inside.  The disgruntled 
employee is one to keep an eye on, but all employees need to change the way they know and 
protect from the inside out. 
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Appendix A National Equivalent Standards to the United States ISO 27002 
Countries Equivalent Standard 
 Australia  
 New Zealand 
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27002:2006 
 Brazil ISO/IEC NBR 17799/2007 – 27002 
 Chile NCH2777 ISO/IEC 17799/2000 
 China GB/T 22081-2008 
 Czech Republic ČSN ISO/IEC 27002:2006 
 Denmark DS484:2005 
 Estonia EVS-ISO/IEC 17799:2003, 2005 version in translation 
 Japan JIS Q 27002 
 Lithuania LST ISO/IEC 27002:2009 (adopted ISO/IEC 27002:2005, ISO/IEC 17799:2005) 
 Netherlands NEN-ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
 Peru NTP-ISO/IEC 17799:2007 
 Poland PN-ISO/IEC 17799:2007, based on ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
 Russia ГОСТ/Р ИСО МЭК 17799-2005 
 South Africa SANS 17799:2005 
 Spain UNE 71501 
 Sweden SS 627799 
 Turkey TS ISO/IEC 27002 
 Ukraine СОУ Н НБУ 65.1 СУІБ 2.0:2010 
 United Kingdom BS ISO/IEC 27002:2005 
 Uruguay UNIT/ISO 17799:2005 
– National Equivalent Standards ("ISO/IEC 27002", 2011) 
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Appendix B - Indicators that determine the relative “risk level” of an individual 
 
1. Accepting Feedback – the employee is observed to have a difficult time accepting 
criticism, tends to take criticism personally or becomes defensive when message is 
delivered.  Employee has been observed being unwilling to acknowledge errors; or 
admitting to mistakes; may attempt to cover up errors through lying or deceit. 
2. Anger management – the employee often allows anger to get pent up inside; employee 
has trouble managing lingering emotional feelings of anger or rage.  Holds strong 
grudges. 
3. Disengagement – the employee keeps to self, is detached, withdrawn and tends not to 
interact with individuals or groups. 
4. Disregards authority - the employee disregards rules, authority or policies.    Employee 
 feels  above  the  rules  or  that  they  only  apply  to  others.   
5. Performance - the  staff  member  has  received  a  corrective  action  (below 
 expectation  performance  review,  verbal  warning,  written  reprimand,  suspension, 
 termination)  based  on  poor  performance.   
6. Stress - the  employee  appears  to  be  under  physical,  mental,  or  emotional  strain  or 
 tension that  he/she  has  difficulty  handling. 
7. Confrontational - employee  exhibits  argumentative  or  aggressive  behavior  or  is 
 involved  in  bullying  or  intimidation. 
8. Personal issues - staff  member  has  difficulty  keeping  personal  issues  separate  from 
 work  and  these  issues  interfere  with  work. 
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9. Self-centered - the  staff  member  disregards  needs  or  wishes  of  others,  concerned 
 primarily  with  own  interests  and  welfare.    
10. Dependability - employee is unable to keep commitments/promises; unworthy of trust.    
11. Absenteeism - staff member has received a disciplinary action (verbal warning, written 
reprimand, suspension, termination) for excessive time away from work. 
 
 
 
(Greitzer et al., 2009, p. 9)
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